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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the relationship between land property rights and household labor allocation. It posits 
that land titling has two opposite effects on labor decisions. On one hand, enhancement of tenure security 
should lead to reductions in guarding requirements and to increases in the hours that households spend off 
their land (Field effect). On the other hand, decreases in the risk of expropriation should lead to higher 
parcel-attached investments and to higher labor productivity related to land (productivity effect). To 
investigate this hypothesis, a massive land titling program in rural Peru (the Special Program of Land 
Titling, or PETT) is analyzed. Propensity score matching estimations suggest that the productivity effect 
is much larger than the Field effect, leading to overall increases in household labor allocations to 
agricultural self-employed activities. These estimations are robust to different specifications within a 
cross-section and a four-round panel dataset. 
Keywords:  property rights, land titling, labor allocation 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
There is widespread consensus in the economic literature regarding the importance of property rights for 
economic development (for example, North 1981; De Long and Shleifer 1993; Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001). The basic idea is simple: Property rights allow agents to reap the benefits of their 
investments, align their incentives, promote the allocation of resources to their most profitable uses, and 
spur economic growth. An unclear definition of ownership is regarded as one of the factors that hinder 
growth in the developing world and impede poverty reduction. An absence of property rights has an 
especially pervasive impact on the poor because these populations cannot afford to invest their scarce 
resources in capital that might be expropriated afterward and because such an absence prevents 
collateralization and transferability of their few assets. In this spirit, their dead capital cannot be used to 
finance any new investments or to cushion any shocks that reduce their income. 
Existing economic literature on developing countries has focused primarily on the impact of 
ownership on credit access and land-attached investments. On one hand, the balance on the former is 
mixed: Although some studies claim a positive impact of titling (for example, Feder et al. 1988), an 
increasing number of papers find that the effect is negligible (for example, Pender and Kerr 1999; Place 
and Migot-Adholla 1998; Boucher, Barham, and Carter 2005; Field and Torero 2004; Galiani and 
Schargrodsky 2007). The general consensus seems to be that property rights are probably a necessary but 
insufficient condition for credit and that titling efforts in developing countries need to be accompanied by 
other policies in order to have an effect. On the other hand, the balance on property-specific investments, 
in contrast, seems to be less ambiguous. Besley (1995); Gavian and Fafchamps (1996); Carter and Yao 
(1999); Deininger and Chamorro (2002); Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak (2002); Antle et al. (2003); and 
Field (2005) find a theoretically predicted positive relationship between investment and property rights. 
In the particular case of Peru, a few papers have dealt with these issues. For the purposes of this 
study, it is of particular relevance that, with the same dataset used here, Torero and Field (2005) 
document no changes in access to credit or increases in land-attached investments related to property 
titles. Moreover, this relationship in rural Peru has also been documented by Fort (2007, 2008
1), Larson et 
al. (2000), Antle et al. (2003), and Barrantes and Trivelli (1994).
2 
However, the relationship between property rights on one side and investments and credit 
constraints on the other remains open: If households with property rights do make more land-attached 
investments and most of them remain credit constrained, how do they finance these investments? To my 
knowledge, the only paper dealing with this unexplored aspect is by Carter and Olinto (2003), who argue 
that small landholders might increase their fixed assets only at the expense of reducing their mobile 
capital, leaving their overall investment unaltered. 
More recently, a few studies have analyzed the impact of property rights on household labor 
decisions. The most salient paper in this area is that of Field (2007). She analyzes the impact of a titling 
program for urban squatters in Peru and argues that squatter households devote time to protecting their 
dwellings. Her results suggest that granting ownership rights reduces the need for this duty and allows for 
more hours of work away from home. 
While Field’s paper focuses on housing titling programs for urban squatters, this analysis 
explores whether land titling in rural areas has a different impact. In this paper it is asserted that the main 
                                                       
1 Using a different and independently collected dataset, Fort analyzes the Special Program of Land Titling (PETT), the same 
as Torero and Field (2005), and reaches the same conclusions as Torero and Field. In this vein, Fort (2008, 325) argues that “the 
results show that there is a positive effect of titling on the probability of making investments as well as on the value of 
investments… This effect could be almost entirely attributed to changes in farmer’s willingness to invest and not to better access 
to credit.”  
2 Larson et al. (2000), Antle et al. (2003), and Barrantes and Trivelli (1994) focus on particular areas of rural Peru. First, 
Larson et al. analyze the case of the valley of Huaral and find a positive relationship between titling and the construction of 
waterways and canals. Additionally, they find that titled farmers exhibit greater use of conservation techniques. Second, Antle et 
al. analyze the impact of titling on investment in terraces in the department of Cajamarca in northern Peru and find that the 
probability of investment in terraces increases by 6.6 percent with land registration. Finally, Barrantes and Trivelli focus on the 
valley of Cañete and find that titling does not have an impact on credit access. 2 
difference between the two is that the latter grants property rights to a productive asset while the former 
does not. In this sense, a theoretical model is established. in which land ownership rights have two 
opposite effects on labor allocation. Following Field’s logic, titling might increase the number of off-farm 
hours of work: landowners have a smaller need to guard their plots and thus reduce the time spent on 
agricultural activities on their land, and spend more time away from their plots. This paper also argues 
that the productive nature of land brings an additional effect in the form of a return to agricultural self-
employed activities. As supported by both theoretical and empirical evidence, property rights seem to 
provide investment incentives that are specific to parcels. Then, if there are any complementarities 
between capital and labor in agricultural self-employed activities, the marginal return of working more 
hours on the land should increase relative to competing alternative activities. Thus, the productivity effect 
should lead—contrary to the Field effect —to increases in the allocation of labor to agricultural activities 
on the farmer’s own land. 
Additionally, a different potential source that households might use to finance increases in land-
attached assets was preliminarily explored. This paper asserts—in the line of Carter and Olinto (2003)—
that these increases might come at the expense of reduced accumulation of other types of capital. The 
main difference suggested is that this process may be driven by shifts in investments from nonagricultural 
to agricultural activities. 
Thus, the contribution of the paper is twofold. First, it analyzes an alternative channel through 
which land titling might affect labor allocation in rural areas and empirically tests the relative weight of 
the Field effect vis-à-vis the productivity effect. Second, it builds upon the Carter and Olinto hypothesis 
and proposes an alternative channel by which titled households finance increases in land-attached capital. 
For these purposes, the paper uses data from the Programa Especial de Titulación de Tierras y 
Catastro Rural (PETT, or Special Program of Land Titling), a massive land titling program in rural Peru. 
To date, the PETT has issued more than 800,000 new property certificates, offering them to previously 
untitled households with very few requirements and virtually for free. This type of assignment allows the 
problem of endogeneity between property rights and household choices, which has hampered many of the 
previous papers, to be addressed. Two pieces of information are analyzed: a cross-section survey and a 
four-round panel dataset of households. The analysis divides a household’s labor structure into three 
categories: wage earning, nonagricultural self-employed, and agricultural self-employed. Propensity score 
matching methods in both datasets are used to disentangle the effect of property titles on the incomes and 
hours of work in these activities. Within this framework, labor reallocation and average returns per hour 
of work in each category are estimated, checking for any patterns and trade-offs. 
The main results of this paper are twofold. First, it finds that property titles change the allocation 
of labor from nonagricultural to agricultural self-employed activities. In this sense, it provides some 
evidence about the prevalence of the productivity effect over the Field effect. Second, it suggests that 
these increases in agricultural self-employed hours are accompanied by more-than-proportional rises in 
income in this category. The evidence for the latter is weaker but would imply increases in productivity in 
this sector. Analogously, though in a smaller magnitude, it also finds reductions in the return per hour of 
nonagricultural self-employed activities. Even when these results may suggest some recomposition of 
capital between activities, lack of detailed data on alternative investments prevents stronger evidence 
about this possibility from being determined at this point. 
Arguably due to controls for time-invariant unobservable characteristics, differences in 
magnitude arise from the cross-section and panel data estimates for the relation between titling and the 
composition of income and labor allocation. But, all in all, the direction of the results is robust to different 
specifications and samples. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model for the 
effect of titling on labor allocation. Section 3 presents a description of the institutional context leading to 
the implementation of PETT. Section 4 discusses the data and the construction of the cross-section and 
panel samples and spells out the methodological approach. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 
presents some concluding remarks. 3 
2.  THEORETICAL MODEL 
Two main approaches have been suggested to model the effect of property rights on households’ 
productive decisions. The first, proposed by Besley (1995), explains why households with better-defined 
property rights invest more in parcel-attached capital. He argues that tenure insecurity acts as a random 
tax on agricultural activities. In this setting, land investments are risky because if the parcel is effectively 
expropriated, then the capital in it is also taken away. In his view, tenure security is a function of formal 
property rights; thus, a titling program should lead to an increase in agricultural self-employed 
investments. The second approach is that of Field (2007), who analyzed the impact of weak property 
rights for housing among urban squatters. Her argument is that tenure security is not a sole function of 
formal property rights but also of the effort that households exert in guarding their estates. According to 
her model, if formal property rights and guarding time are substitutes in providing tenure security, an 
enhancement of the former should lead to a reduction of the latter. The time released can subsequently be 
spent working outside the home, inducing an increase in labor supply. 
The model proposed in this paper integrates both Besley’s and Field’s approaches in a single 
framework to model the impact of formal land property rights on rural households’ labor allocations. On 
one side, it includes Besley’s incentives of property rights for increases in land investments. His model 
mainly deals with capital incentives. However, a straightforward extension is that complementarity 
between labor and capital should also induce changes in agricultural self-employment. On the other side, 
the framework includes Field’s notion of time allocation decisions as determinants of tenure security. 
To incorporate this intuition, some additional assumptions are introduced. First, the model 
modifies the role of guarding labor in Field’s model by including some differences due to the productive 
nature of land, as opposed to the unproductive nature of dwellings.
3 The model posits that agricultural 
self-employed hours—in addition to their effect as direct productive inputs—play an additional role by 
informally protecting property rights. In this setting, households may overspend time working on the land 
as a consequence of this additional effect. Second, it incorporates a restriction for credit access, which 
characterizes most rural households’ contexts in developing countries, including Peru, as discussed in 
Section 1. This constraint is brought into the model to better reflect most of the findings in the recent 
literature. Third, it incorporates a nonagricultural self-employed sector. This addition is also in line with 
empirical evidence about the increasing importance of the nonfarm economy in rural areas (for example, 
Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon 2007). 
More formally, assume a rural household has three sources of income: (1) agricultural self-
employment, (2) nonagricultural self-employment, and (3) wage-earning activities. For tractability, 
assume that the household has a constant utility of leisure and maximizes its expected income subject to 
time and investment constraints.
4 Denote 𝐹(.), 𝐻𝑓, 𝐾𝑓, and 𝑃 as the output, hours of work, capital, and 
(normalized) price of agricultural self-employment and 𝐺(.), 𝐻𝑛, and 𝐾𝑛 as the output, hours of work, 
and capital of nonagricultural self-employment. Assume constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
production functions for both activities. 
[ ]
α α α γ
/ 1
) 1 ( ) , ( f f f f K a aH K H F − + =           (1a) 
[ ]
β β β η
/ 1
) 1 ( ) , ( n n n n K b bH K H G − + =            (1b) 
                                                       
3 Field’s approach, based on the Agricultural Household Model, includes a tenure security function as a function of time 
exclusively used for guarding purposes. This tenure security function is solely part of the household’s utility; its relationship with 
the production side relies on the time constraint (that is, guarding takes away time that could be used working). 
4 For tractability purposes, this assumes that the household is risk neutral. 4 
where  1 , 0 ≤ ≤ b a . The household also receives an income from salaried employment, which is 
determined by  w H and the prevailing wage in the market (w). Thus, the household income is determined 
by
w f f n n wH K H F K H PG + + ) , ( ) , ( . 
There are two constraints in this problem. First, as suggested by previous findings in the 
empirical literature, it is credit constrained. In this sense, it holds a limited endowment 𝐾 � that it can 
allocate as capital between alternative self-employed activities (that is, 𝐾𝑓 + 𝐾𝑛 ≤ 𝐾 �). Second, there is 
the usual time restriction, such that 𝐻𝑛 + 𝐻𝑓 + 𝐻𝑤 ≤ 𝑇. 
Furthermore, the household faces a risk of expropriation because its land—and, hence, its land- 
attached investments—might be taken away. This probability of expropriation is a function of formal 
property rights (characterized by the parameter 𝜃) and the time spent working on the land (𝐻𝑓). In this 
line, 𝐻𝑓 has two effects on agricultural production. On one side, it has a standard effect on output via the 
agricultural production function. On the other side, it guards capital and reduces the probability of 
expropriation. This probability is modeled through the function  ) , ( θ φ f H , which is decreasing and 
convex in both arguments:  θ φ ,
0 ≤
f H φ ;  θθ φ ,
0 ≥
f f H H φ . Additionally, assume that θ  and  f H
 are 
substitutes in the tenure security function (that is, 
0 ≥
f H θ φ ): As formal property rights arise, informal 
guarding through  f H  becomes marginally less important. For simplicity, assume that the household 
chooses the level of  f K  but faces the risk of expropriation after it has been used in the production process. 
If r is the unitary value of the capital (relative to the nonagricultural output), then the expected capital loss 
is  f f f f K H r K H L ) , ( ) | , ( θ φ θ = . 
Then the household’s problem is: 
) | , ( ) , ( ) , (   θ f f w f f n n K H L wH H K F H K PG − + + MAX          
K K K T H H H f n w f n ≤ + ≤ + +   ;     : subject to                            (2) 
Assume that both constraints are binding and that there exists an interior solution.
5 Then, the 
first-order conditions are as follows: 
  [ ] w rK PaH








  (3a) 
  [ ] w K b bH bH n n n = − +
− − 1 1
1
) 1 (
β β β β η   (3b) 
  [ ] [ ]
1 1 1 1
1 1
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) )( 1 ( ) 1 (
− − − − − + − + − − = − −
β α β β β α α α η φ γ n n f f f f K b bH K a aH K K b r K a P   (3c) 
Equations (3a)–(3c) simply state that the productivity of labor in both self-employed activities 
should be equal to the external wage and that the productivity of capital should be the same among its 
alternative uses. To analyze the impact of formal property rights enhancement, the comparative statics 
were calculated for 𝐾𝑓, 𝐻𝑓, and 𝐻𝑛
6. Total differentiation of the system of first-order conditions yields: 
                                                       
5 The conditions for the solution to be a maximum rely on the determinant of the system: 
]. ) 2 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ) 1 ( ( [ ] ) )( 1 ( [ ) ( ) 1 )( 1 ( (.)
2 2 2
] ) 1 ( [
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1
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To assure a maximum, the following restrictions can be imposed:   and 
0 ) 2 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ (.)
2 2 ≤ + − − − − + F H K H a Pa K a aH K H r
f f f f H H f H f f f f f f H φ φ α φ
α α α α . 
6 Comparative statics for the system were calculated using Mathematica.  5 
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where: 
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The signs of  θ ∂
∂ f K
,  θ ∂
∂ f H
, and  n
Hn
θ ∂
∂  are ambiguous. In terms of the model, the Field effect would be 
represented by the size of 
f H θ φ . If 
f H θ φ  is large enough, there is a substitution in the tenure security 
function between formal property rights and agricultural labor for guarding purposes. In this case, the 
agricultural activity (being directly affected by the titling) decreases and there is a substitution toward 








,  0 ≥ ∂
∂
θ
n H ,  0 ≥ ∂
∂
θ
n K ).  
There is also an effect by which agricultural capital is enhanced. This effect is represented by the 
size of  θ φ , which captures the direct decrease in land-attached expropriation risk derived from land 
titling. If  θ φ  is large relative to 
f H θ φ , we are able to capture the pure investment effect. In an extreme, 
consider a situation in which  0 > θ φ ,  0 =
f H θ φ . In this case, due to the increase in the benefits of land 




. However, the impact on labor allocation is somewhat more 
ambiguous and depends on the complementarity between labor and capital in the agricultural production 
function. To illustrate this point, take the two extreme cases: perfect complementarity between factors (
−∞ → α ) and perfect substitutability ( 1 = α ). 
First, assume that  −∞ → α . Replacing  0 =
f H θ φ  and taking limits of (4a)–(4c) leads to (5a)–
(5c). In this case,  θ ∂
∂ f K
 and  θ ∂
∂ f H
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On the contrary, assume that the factors in  (.) F  are perfect substitutes ( 1 = α ). To reduce the 
number of activities, assume that  w a > γ  (so  0 = n H  ).
7 Then, the household problem reduces to 
[ ] [ ] f H f f f f K r K K b H T b K a aH P
f ) , (
/ 1
) )( 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( θ
β β β φ η γ − − − + − + − + , for which the following 
condition should hold in an interior solution:
8  
  ( ) [ ] [ ]
r a H K b
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− ) 1 (   ,
) 1 ( 1
  (6) 
If  0 =
f H θ φ , condition (6) implies that an increase in θ  leads to higher  , lower  , or a combination of 
both.
9 In this way, when there is perfect substitutability between production factors,  0 ≥ ∂
∂
θ
f K  and  0 ≤ ∂
∂
θ
f H . 
Thus, the results of the model show the following: 
1.  If the Field effect is large, substitution of labor and formal property rights in the tenure security 
function can lead to a reduction in agricultural and an increase in nonagricultural labor. Intuitively, 
there is a shift away from farm labor as the guarding requirements of the plot are relieved. 
2.  If the productivity effect is large enough, the reduction in the risk of expropriation leads to higher 
investments in agricultural capital. However, the reallocation of labor depends on the 
complementarity or substitutability of labor and capital in the agricultural production function. If they 
are complementary factors, there will be an increase in agricultural and a reduction in nonagricultural 
labor. However, this is not the case if they are substitutes. 
All in all, the impact of titling on labor allocation is ambiguous. The model is a good starting 
point to reason out the mechanisms through which property rights might affect households’ income-
generating strategies. However, both effects cannot be estimated separately. . First, this would require a 
structural model, which is a daunting task because of limited data. Second, it would require the 
assumption of a specific functional form for the expropriation function, of which little is known. Thus, 
this paper attempts only a reduced-form estimate of the net impact of the productivity vis-à-vis the Field 
effect. The parameters of the model cannot be estimated and do not determine the relative magnitudes of 
the two drivers. This paper attempts only to calculate the net effect of property rights on labor allocation. 
 
                                                       
7 It is straightforward to derive the results for  w a < γ . We only need to substitute 
f H K r a
f φ γ −  for  . In both cases, these 
expressions are not affected by a change in θ . 
8 Note that  [ ]
β β β η
/ 1
(.) ) )( 1 ( ) ( f f K K b H T b G − − + − = . This rules out  T H f =  and  K K f =  as possible solutions. The case where 
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f H . 7 
3.  INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
In the early 1990s, land property rights in Peru were highly informal. Poor property rights are the 
result of a long historical process that can be traced back to the late 1960s. In 1968, the Peruvian 
government implemented a large agrarian reform. As part of the reform, large estates (haciendas) 
were expropriated from their owners and redistributed among the workers. These workers were 
required to form cooperatives to administer these lands. During this process, it is estimated that 9.4 
million hectares were expropriated and adjudicated to cooperatives (IADB 2001). 
By the mid-1970s, most of these cooperatives were bankrupt; however, legislation prevented 
them from dissolving. The laws allowing for their dissolution were not passed until 1980.
10 As they 
dissolved, these cooperatives transferred their land to the individual members. However, this transfer 
did not include any official documents. 
These chaotic land transfers delayed the formation of a true and accurate land property 
registry. Moreover, for many additional years, the country kept laws restricting the sale, rental, and 
collateralization of land and requirements for the maximum and minimum sizes of plots.
11 All these 
factors stimulated extralegal arrangements in the land market that led to a prevailingly high degree of 
informality. The 1994 Agricultural Census reveals that, out of a total of 5.7 million parcels, only 
971,000 (17 percent) had registered property titles (Antle et al. 2003). 
As a consequence, there has been a high degree of land tenure insecurity in Peru. Some 
hacienda owners have demanded to have their land returned in judiciary courts. This has been 
possible due to two circumstances. First, when the haciendas were expropriated, the government 
issued compensatory bonds (Bonos de la Reforma Agraria) to the landowners. However, even after 
four decades of agrarian reform, the Peruvian government has still not paid these bonds. Some argue 
that rather than an expropriation, this was actually a confiscation and thus should be void. Second, the 
absence of official documentation of land transfers between cooperatives and their members increase 
fears of legal retaliation among landholders. Without proof, poorer peasants are usually afraid of 
facing the richer former hacienda owners in court.
12 
During the early 1990s, a set of initiatives was passed to eliminate the cumbersome 
restrictions on land transactions. Nevertheless, this set of laws had little impact on formalization. 
Among other arguments, the lengthy and costly process of formalization of property is considered to 
be one of the obstacles for farmers.
13 In this context, the Peruvian government created the Programa 
Especial de Titulación de Tierras y Catastro Rural (Special Program of Land Titling, or PETT) in 
1992. The objective of the project was to build an accurate cadastre of agricultural parcels and to 
provide property titles to informal landholders. Communities were selected by PETT officers, and 
surveyors then traveled to these communities to convey information about land ownership status. 
When the landholders did not have a property title, surveyors offered a Certificate of 
Possession if they could prove “direct, continuous, peaceful, and public” occupation of the land for 
five or more years. Few requirements were imposed to demonstrate occupation. According to the 
PETT regulation, the following were acceptable proofs: (1) documents related agricultural loans; (2) 
municipal fee payments; (3) receipts of payments for irrigation water, inputs, or other factors where 
the plot can be identified; (4) registration in the community irrigation association; (5) sale receipts of 
agricultural/livestock output; (6) judiciary inspection of the plot; or (7) any other document “proving 
possession.” In the latter case, it is enough to present a written declaration from all adjacent neighbors 
for confirmation. After the Certificate of Possession is issued, it is sent to the National 
                                                       
10 Legislative Decree 85 of 1981 formally allowed the dissolution of agricultural cooperatives. 
11 For a detailed discussion of changes in the law regarding land ownership, see Eguren (2004). 
12 For example, the National Agrarian Confederation (which groups small landholders) during its September 2003 
strike demanded that the government “enact a legal security decree to guarantee the property of the beneficiaries of the 
Agrarian Reform putting end, once and for all, to the land lawsuits supported by bad judges.” The press release, published in 
many Peruvian newspapers, can be found here: http://www.rel-uita.org/old/sindicatos/cna.htm 
13 There are no specific measures of how lengthy or costly the process of land titling in Peru can be. De Soto (2000) 
provides a vivid description of the red tape and prohibitively expensive cost of formalizing urban dwellings in Lima in the 
1990s. The difficulties of titling land in rural areas were probably even larger. 8 
Superintendence of Public Registration (SUNARP). This agency notifies the community neighbors 
about the registration and sets a 30-day period in which complaints can be presented. If no complaint 
is filed, then SUNARP registers the property rights. The delivery of final property titles to the owners 
is usually carried out in a massive public ceremony. It is of high importance that this process is 
implemented at no cost to landholders. 
PETT was launched slowly in 1993, but the bulk of the titling process started in 1996, when it 
was boosted by loans from international agencies (IADB 2001). The process was implemented 
through a “cadastre and titling of individual landholdings in pre-determined geographic zones, within 
pre-established boundaries and in systematic registration (sweeping).”
14 In other words, the project 
selected communities and swept them, offering titles to households—implying that there was no 
selection of potential recipients of titles within selected villages. The 2004 PETT survey (described in 
Section 4) indicates that around 89 percent of households in villages where any certificate was issued 
by PETT received property titles. Fort (2008) also finds that only a reduced number of households 
were not able to receive their property titles within villages in which PETT operated. Some anecdotal 
evidence also indicates that before moving to a different area, PETT waited for most of a community 
to be titled in order to hand over the titles in a public ceremony. Presumably, households that were 
not titled within selected communities were absent during the days in which PETT registrars visited 
the village or had problems with the required documentation. All this information is consistent with 
the sweeping strategy of the program. 
PETT has been important for at least two reasons. First, it has had a very large scope. The 
program has titled and registered more than 1.5 million parcels, increasing the share of legally owned 
plots by 50 percent (Fort 2008). This makes it one of the largest land-titling programs in the world. 
Second, if the project aimed to reduce tenure insecurity, there is evidence that this goal has been 
accomplished. For example, Larson et al. (2000) interviewed a sample of farmers in the valley of 
Huaral (around 80 kilometers north of Lima) and found that among untitled households, 73 percent 
thought that titles would increase their tenure security.
15 Also, the PETT survey (described in the 
following section) shows that the program enhanced their tenure security. When households were 
asked about the most important gains of titling, 66.5 percent of them considered tenure security issues 
(that is, a reduced risk of land expropriation, a decreased likelihood of having their land squatted on, 
and a greater possibility of bequeath) to be the most important benefits. 
Moreover, from a methodological standpoint, PETT allows some identification problems that 
hamper most of the previous literature to be addressed. The way in which PETT operated seems to 
indicate that there was little self-selection of beneficiaries at the household level. Unfortunately, there 
was no experimental selection of villages in which titles were offered, and the rules for the selection 
of communities were not clear. This poses some challenges for the identification strategy, which must 
rely, by assumption, on selection on observables (discussed in Section 4). Anecdotal evidence and 
interviews with PETT officers suggest that the communities chosen were the most accessible ones. 
While the loan contract with IADB imposed implicit goals for titled land, it did not establish criteria 
for the selection of villages. In a country like Peru, which is characterized by considerable geographic 
diversity and heterogeneous accessibility, the most likely option was to choose the communities that 
could be most readily accessed in order to more easily reach titling goals. Another potential bias 
might have come from program officers choosing communities that had the highest potential of 
reaping the benefits of titling (for example, more educated, with better land quality and climate, and 
so on). In this line, previous work analyzing the impact of the PETT project has also shown this 
concern (Torero and Field 2005; Fort 2008). This would be likely if the government were pursuing a 
favorable impact evaluation of the program by IADB.
                                                       
14 See Appendix A of the loan contract between the Inter-American Development Bank and the Republic of Peru in 
IADB (2001). 
15 Interviewed households could give more than one perceived benefit for titling. In addition to the increase in tenure 
security, other benefits of property titles were the following: enhancement of access to credit (44 percent), larger possibility 
of getting credit from formal sources (30 percent), sale of land (10 percent), and facilitation of inheritance (5.1 percent). 9 
4.  DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The data for the evaluation of PETT were collected in 2004 by the Group for the Analysis of 
Development (GRADE). One shortcoming was that the program did not gather baseline information prior 
to implementation. To address this problem, the evaluation team decided to follow up with households 
from the Peruvian Standard Living Measurement Surveys (LSMS) of 1994, 1997, and 2000. In addition 
to the usual LSMS information, the 2004 survey asked households if they had received a title by PETT 
and, if so, when they had received it. In this way, their baseline (pretreatment) information could be 
inferred from their reports in the previous surveys. 
The sample was collected to resurvey most of the households in the 2000 LSMS. Unfortunately, 
it was not possible to obtain information from households that had moved from their 2000 locations. The 
attrition rate during this period was around 10 percent. To gain information from households that had 
been titled in previous periods, random samples from the 1994 and 1997 surveys were also resurveyed. A 
subsample of the 1994 and 1997 households was interviewed in the 2000 round because of a reduced 
panel component in the LSMS design. Additionally, to have enough evaluation cases, an oversampling of 
the areas in which PETT operated was included, for which no panel information is available. This 
oversampling was proportional to the sizes of the primary sampling units in the 2000 LSMS, preserving 
the representativeness of the sample at the domain level of the original survey.
16 
With this framework, two samples of information, a cross-section dataset and a panel of 
households, were constructed. Regarding the cross-sectional data, the variability of households’ 
information in 2004 was exploited. After the exclusion of households that did not own any land or that 
had property titles not awarded by PETT, the final dataset includes 1,043 households, of which 44 percent 
have received the program intervention. 
While the cross-sectional data provide a larger number of observations due to the oversampling, 
the panel allows for removal of any time-invariant unobservables at the cost of a smaller sample. Given 
the complexity of the panel dataset, a brief description is provided. While all households in the panel are 
required to be in the 2004 sample, they can appear in a biannual fashion (2004/1994, 2004/1997, or 
2004/2000), a triannual fashion (2004/2000/1997, 2004/2000/1994, or 2004/1997/1994), or in all years 
(2004/2000/1997/1994). Because of the relatively small sample contained in each subpanel, all the 
observations are pooled together. 
Thus, it should be noted that households may appear in more than two rounds of the survey.
17 In 
the case of titled households, when more than one pretreatment observation is available the observation 
from the closest round to the titling was used.
18 In an analogous way, when titled households have more 
than one post-treatment observation   the one from the closest round immediately after the titling was 
chosen. This procedure better proxies the criteria under which the beneficiaries were chosen by their 
pretreatment characteristics and reduces contamination of the effect due to other factors in the post-
treatment measurement. However, in the case of untitled households, there is no reason to drop any 
available information. In this sense, the number of groups in the control group is increased by 
constructing more than one span. For example, if the household was untitled, three spans were 
constructed for a household surveyed in 2004, 2000, and 1997: 1997–2000, 2000–2004, and 1997–2004. 
The final panel dataset has 572 spans
19: 118 treatment and 454 control spans. 
                                                       
16 For a more detailed description of the sample, see Torero and Field (2005). 
17 For example, a household that was titled in 2002 may appear in the 1997, 2000, and 2004 rounds. Its observations for the 
1997–2000 period would be included in the control group, while the data for the 2000–2004 span would be assigned to the 
treatment group. 
18 For example, a household might declare in the 2004 survey that it had received the title in 1998. If possible, the 
pretreatment characteristics are calculated with the 1997 wave. If the latter is not available, the information from the 1994 round 
was used. However, it is possible that only information for 2000 or none of the pre-2004 rounds were available. In such cases, 
there is no way to recover the pretreatment characteristics and, in this case, these households are dropped from the sample. 
19 These spans are constructed from 419 panel households: 301 untitled and 118 treated ones. 10 
The analysis of the relationship between property rights and households’ decisions is usually 
hampered by their endogenous relation. If households are required to exert effort or incur costs to receive 
a title, then only those perceiving net gains from this process would demand it. A considerable number of 
papers have accounted for this problem only to a limited extent by applying usual exclusion restrictions or 
by exploiting the variability of differences in the security given by alternative titles. The Peruvian context, 
and in particular the data presented here, proves especially favorable in addressing this problem. As 
mentioned, the program registrars were the ones visiting various villages and offering property titles to 
informal owners with few, if any, requirements. In this sense, titling came as a consequence of an 
assignment by PETT, irrespective of individual demand for it. As stated, based on how PETT operated,   
bias from households’ demand was not expected. Nonetheless, biases arising from differences in the 
attributes of the settlements chosen by the program can still affect the analysis. 
Following the impact evaluation literature, the impact of PETT on households’ incomes and time 
allocations was estimated using matching methods (Angrist 1998; Angrist and Krueger 1999). Denote   
as the income and hours of work in wage-earning, agricultural self-employed, and nonagricultural self-
employed activities of the household 𝑖. Next, consider the following two potential outcomes for each of 
these variables:   if the household received a title and   if it did not. Also define 
i D  as an indicator 
variable for the titling, where  1 = i D if the household was titled by PETT and  0 = i D  if the household was 
not. Then the average treatment on the treated (ATT) effect would be defined as: 
] 1 | [ 0 1 = − = i i i D Y Y E τ .  (7) 
A simple comparison of sample means of titled and untitled households would yield a biased 
estimate of , given that: 
   
  ]} 0 | [ ] 1 | [ { ] 1 | [ ] 0 | [ ] 1 | [ 0 0 0 1 0 1 = − = + = − = = − = i i i i i i i i i i i D Y E D Y E D Y Y E D Y E D Y E  
]} 0 | [ ] 1 | [ { ] 0 | [ ] 1 | [ 0 0 0 1 = − = − = − = = i i i i i i i i D Y E D Y E D Y E D Y E τ .  (8) 
The term  ] 0 | [ ] 1 | [ 0 0 = − = i i i i D Y E D Y E in equation (8) represents the bias that would arise 
because the outcomes of the untitled households would not necessarily have been the same as those of the 
titled ones had they benefited by the program. Ideally, if the treatment were assigned randomly, the bias 
would disappear because  i D  would be independent of  i Y1  and  i Y0 . Arguably, assignment of property titles 
was not random, so it was conditioned on a set of observables. As mentioned, there were no clear rules in 
the assignment of the titled villages. However, some anecdotal evidence highlights ease of access to the 
location and PETT officers’ perceptions of potential impact as determinants of the treatment. This is the 
same approach that other papers analyzing PETT have followed (Torero and Field 2005; Fort 2007, 
2008). 
If there is selection on observables, it is possible to condition on this set of variables to calculate 
the ATT. In the case of the cross-sectional data, however, there are no pretreatment characteristics to 
control for the selection of the program. Furthermore, controlling for current household characteristics 
would impose an over-control bias because the post-treatment characteristics had probably been affected 
by the treatment and would therefore be endogenous.
20 To circumvent this problem, a set of proxies were 
proposed for pretreatment characteristics. On one hand, district characteristics from two censuses 
previous to the land titling program, the 1993 Population Census and the 1994 Agricultural Census, were 
                                                       
20 Previous papers have dealt with the relationship of property titles to varied outcomes such as fertility (Field 2003), 
housing decisions (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2004), and education (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2007). Given that these were some 
of the controls I was planning to use, there is a need to look for pre-treatment proxies. 11 
used.
21 These include controls for differences in population, land, agricultural activity characteristics, 
education, and household composition. Additionally, time-invariant geographic characteristics, measures 
of the accessibility of the village such as the distance to the provincial capital, slope, altitude, and regional 
dummies were used. The estimation assumes that this set of variables is close to the one that PETT 
authorities chose to operate the program and that the census variables are good proxies for them. 
Moreover, given that these proxies come from a period prior to the PETT operations, they might arguably 
have determined the treatment but were not subsequently affected by it. 
The reasoning of the estimation is similar for the panel estimations. There are only three 
differences in this case. First, rather than using proxies, the probability of selection is calculated using 
household-specific pretreatment characteristics. Second, to remove time-invariant unobservable attributes, 
the outcome variables are the differences between the pre- and post-treatment values (that is, difference-
in-differences estimation). Fourth, given the various nature of the spans for the control and the treatment 
groups, the control (or controls) for each treated household is forced to come from the same span.
22 
Under these assumptions—upon conditioning on observables  i X  (either proxies or pretreatment 
variables from surveys)—we can get valid counterfactuals for titled households because the untreated 
households would be a close representation of what would have happened to the treated ones had the 
program not taken place. Then, it would hold that: 
] 0 , | [ ] 1 , | [ 0 0 = = = i i i i i i D X Y E D X Y E .  (9) 
Thus, re-expressing (8) with the assumptions embedded in (9),   can be estimated as: 
{ } 1   |   ] 1 , | [ ] 1 , | [ 0 1 = = − = = i i i i i i i D D X Y E D X Y E E τ  
{ } 1   |   ] 0 , | [ ] 1 , | [ 0 1 = = − = = i i i i i i i D D X Y E D X Y E E τ .  (10) 
To reduce the dimensionality problem of conditioning on the full set of variables in  , a 
propensity score is estimated. As suggested by Dehejia and Wahba (1998), the probability of assignment 
to treatment, conditional on pretreatment variables, summarizes the preintervention variables and allows 
for comparison of the treatment and control groups. As suggested by the impact evaluation literature, the 
probability of receiving the titling can be approximated using a probit model. In the case of the panel data, 
however, households may appear more than once in the calculation of the propensity score and their 
observations would be correlated. In this line, a random-effects probit is estimated.
23 
) ( ) | 1 ( β i i i X X D P Φ = =    (11) 
Furthermore, to increase comparability between the observations in the treatment and control 
groups, all the estimations are performed within common support. This procedure excludes the 
observations in the treatment and control groups in which the propensity scores of the treatment and 
                                                       
21 The Population Census was conducted on July 11, 1993, and the Agricultural Census was conducted between October 15 
and November 14, 1994. It should be noted that these are the only two censuses available during the period of analysis. A district 
is the smallest political unit in the country and has, on average, around 2,650 households. These data are the only source of 
indicators that are representative at the district level. 
22 The logic for this is as follows. The Peruvian economy has experienced different trends in each of the periods in the panel. 
For example, 1994–1997 was a period of economic recovery after the crisis following the implementation of structural reforms in 
the early 1990s. The 1997–2000 span was a period of stagnation, and 2000–2004 was characterized by economic expansion 
again. Thus, it would be inappropriate to consider the differences in outcomes of a nontitled household during 1997–2000 as a 
suitable counterfactual for another one titled between 1997 and 2004. 
23 A fixed-effects probit cannot be estimated, because of the incidental parameter problem (see Lancaster 2000). As an 
alternative approach, a random-effects probit is proposed, even when this implies an assumption of orthogonality between the 
explanatory variables and the household-specific disturbance. These results are robust to the exclusion of the random effects. 12 
control groups do not overlap (that is, the controls that are below the minimum propensity score in the 
treatment group and the treatments that have propensity scores that exceed the maximum of the 
propensity score in the control group). 
Following (10) and (11), a propensity score matching ATT estimator can be stated as: 
{ } 1   |   ] 0 ), ( | [ ] 1 ), ( | [ 0 1 = = Φ − = Φ = i i i i i i i D D X Y E D X Y E E β β τ .  (12) 
As a final procedure to estimate the ATT, alternative methods were chosen on which to condition 
the outcomes. Although several methods are available in the literature, the one-to-one, radial, and kernel 
density estimators were used. The standard errors and significance of the estimates are calculated with a 
thousand-iteration bootstrap of the matching procedure. Given that most of   comes from census 
variables, the standard errors are clustered at the district level. 13 
5.  RESULTS 
Cross-Section 
Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics for the labor time allocation and income-generating structure from 
wage-earning, nonagricultural self-employed, and agricultural self-employed activities. While it appears 
that titled households have higher incomes and work more hours in all the activity categories—as 
mentioned in the previous section—no inference about the effect of the treatment can be made from a 
simple mean comparison. 
Table 5.1—Cross-section (2004): Average household income and hours of work in treatment and 
control groups 
  Control  Treatment 
 
Monthly income 
1     
 
Wage earning  334.0  450.9 
*** 
Nonagricultural self-employment  142.2  186.0 
 
Agricultural self-employment  414.3  452.7 
 
Total  890.5  1,089.6 
*** 
Weekly hours of work     
 
Wage earning  54.3  62.6 
** 
Nonagricultural self-employment      9.5  13.0 
** 
Agricultural self-employment  38.4  40.4 
 
Total  102.1  116.0 
*** 
Observations  585  458 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey. 
Note: 
1 Monthly  income is reported in equivalent soles of May 2000 of metropolitan Lima. 
Asterisks denote significance of t-tests, on the difference of means between the treatment and of means between the treatment and 
control groups: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
Summary statistics for the pretreatment characteristics in the titled and untitled groups, based on a 
set of pretreatment proxies, are presented in the first two columns of Table 5.2. The chosen variables at 
the district level were education, household demographics, employment composition, and infrastructure 
variables from the 1993 Population Census and landholding and quality of agricultural potential from the 
1994 Agricultural Census.
24 Additionally, the collection of GPS geo-referenced household locations in 
the 2004 survey was exploited to construct household-specific distance to the provincial capital, slope, 
and altitude measures. The latter allowed the construction of household-specific propensity scores even 
within the same district. 
                                                       
24 One of the problems with this method is that some of the households might have lived in a different location before 1993. 
Thus, attributing to these households the district averages of the 1993 Population Census and the 1994 Agricultural Census would 
be incorrect. However, only 5 percent of the sample is affected by this problem. The exclusion of these households does not 
affect the cross-sectional results in this section. 14 
Table 5.2—Cross-section (2004): Unmatched and matched summary statistics of treated and 
control group 
      Unmatched  Matched
1    
      Control  Treatment    Control  Treatment    
Population Census 1993 (district)             
  % of households (HHs) with pipeline 
water 
22.10%  22.30%    22.20%  22.60%   
  % of HHs with electricity  26.90%  26.20%    25.80%  26.00%   
  % of HHs with dirt floors  71.70%  73.60%    73.90%  75.20%   
  % of HHs with sewerage  13.00%  14.40%    14.50%  13.80%   
  % of population speaking native 
language 
26.50%  29.50%    29.00%  34.10% 
** 
  % of population with secondary 
education 
21.70%  20.20% 
***  20.00%  20.10%   
  % of population with tertiary 
education 
5.70%  6.60% 
***  6.50%  6.10%   
  Average dependency ratio  0.50  0.49    0.49  0.50   
  % of population working in 
agriculture 
18.70%  26.40% 
***  26.90%  27.40%   
  Population density in district  84.21  108.83 
**  110.48  189.63   
Agricultural Census 1994 (district)             
  Average size of landholding (ha)  3.41  3.69    3.61  3.48   
  % of land with irrigation in district  53.00%  39.00% 
***  37.60%  35.40%   
  Total agricultural land in district (ha)  6,799.6  7,440.55    7,641.75  7,046.60   
  Bioclimate score  52.29  61.85 
***  64.3  66.92   
  Score of soil quality  58.02  60.33 
***  60.66  59.61   
Geographic variables (HH)             
  Distance to provincial capital (km)  16.37  11.04 
***  10.72  10.38   
  Slope  10.44  12.44 
***  12.81  13.8   
  Altitude (km above sea level)  1.39  2.05 
***  2.10  2.15   
  Jungle
2  30.10%  29.20%    29.10%  27.60%   
  Highlands
2  44.50%  65.60% 
***  67.00%  70.50%   
Weather variables (district)             
  Average rainfall in district 
3 
(mm/month) 
67.44  61.33 
**  61.53  58.82   
  Average temperature (°C)  16.87  13.87 
***  13.68  13.13   
Observations  585  458    417  417   
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey, 
Notes: 
1 Means of treatment and control groups after a one-to-one propensity score matching on common support (with a caliper 
of 0.05) on all the variables included in this table.  
2 In the case of discrete variables, a t-test of proportions was applied. 
3 Average of the minimum and maximum monthly rainfalls in the district (in mm). 
Asterisks denote significance of t-tests, on the difference of means between the treatment and of means between the treatment and 
control groups: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
An initial analysis of raw means (in the first two columns) confirms that titled and untitled 
households were arguably selected based on different pretreatment characteristics. More specifically, it 
suggests that titling was more intensive in areas with a higher population working in agricultural 
activities, better soil, and (albeit not significant) slightly larger agricultural holdings. Furthermore, these 
results confirm anecdotal evidence suggesting that the program more intensively targeted areas that were 
closer to provincial capitals, which are probably the easiest to reach. This suggests that the beneficiaries 
of PETT were on average 5 kilometers closer to capitals than households that did not receive titles. 
To address these differences in preintervention characteristics,  a propensity score matching 
estimation was performed based on the variables of Table 5.2 and  applying the matching methods 
suggested in Section 4. The probit estimation for program selection is presented in Table A.1 in the 15 
appendix. To check for balancing in the variables of the score between the treatment and control groups, 
the third and fourth columns of Table 5.2 present the means of the matched sample based on a one-to-one 
matching (with a caliper of 0.05). Although the percentage of the 1993 population speaking a native 
language in the district remains statistically different between the titled and untitled groups, none of the 
rest of the pretreatment proxies are significantly different.
25 Even when not conclusive, this exercise 
suggests that the procedure would eliminate the bias (at least on observables) derived from the 
nonrandom selection of the program. 
Table 5.3 provides the difference in the outcome variables between the treatment and control 
groups using one-to-one (unrestricted and with a 0.05 caliper
26), radial (with radii of 0.05 and 0.01
27), and 
kernel matching (with a 0.06 bandwidth
28) techniques. Different matching techniques yield similar 
results, suggesting relative robustness in the effects. The calculated ATT effects indicate that titled 
households increase their monthly income from agricultural self-employed activities by around 160 soles 
(about 16 percent of the sample mean income). Additionally, any increase in the weekly hours of work in 
the same category is much smaller: about 3.5 hours (3 percent of sample mean). Furthermore, the results 
suggest that neither income nor hours of work changed by much and neither is statistically significant. 
Table 5. 3—Cross-section (2004): Average treatment on the treated (ATT) effect for household 
income and hours of work, by matching method 
Dependent  One-to-One  Radius  Kernel   
Variable  No Caliper    Caliper=0.05    r=0.05    r=0.01     
Monthly income 
1                     
  Wage   42.73 
  57.37 
  38.26 
  45.45 
  41.71 
 
  earning  (89.15) 
  (83.00) 
  (67.32) 
  (70.80) 
  (65.50) 
 
  Nonagricultural   6.91 
  9.57 
  16.47 
  11.30 
  12.57 
 
  self-employment  (63.59) 
  (63.32) 
  (47.25) 
  (51.63) 
  (45.02) 
 
  Agricultural  154.38 
  158.69 
  165.85 
  155.32 
  161.33 
 
  self-employment  (94.81) 
*  (91.85) 
*  (70.34) 
**  (74.56) 
**  (71.71) 
** 
  Total  204.01 
  225.63 
  220.58 
  212.08 
  215.61 
 
    (129.56) 
  (121.22) 
*  (93.09) 
**  (104.34) 
*  (92.74) 
** 
Weekly hours of work 
   
   
   
   
 
  Wage   4.77 
  4.75 
  3.66 
  4.05 
  3.72 
 
  earning  (7.42) 
  (7.38) 
  (5.81) 
  (5.91) 
  (5.50) 
 
  Nonagricultural   -1.37 
  -1.21 
  -0.30 
  -0.74 
  -0.52 
 
  self-employment  (4.09) 
  (3.97) 
  (3.03) 
  (3.37) 
  (2.99) 
 
  Agricultural  3.34 
  3.71 
  3.81 
  3.19 
  3.64 
 
  self-employment  (3.43) 
  (3.26) 
  (2.49) 
  (2.76) 
  (2.51) 
 
  Total  6.75 
  7.25 
  7.17 
  6.49 
  6.83 
 
    (8.78) 
  (8.45) 
  (6.11) 
  (6.62) 
  (6.26) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey, the 1994 Peruvian National Agricultural Census and the 1993 
Peruvian Population Census. 
Note:   Matching based on propensity score (in common support), estimated through a probit equation of the treatment dummy on 
the covariates included in Table 5.2. The probit estimation is reported in Table A.1 in the appendix. 
1 Monthly income is reported in equivalent soles of May 2000 of metropolitan Lima. 
Standard errors in parentheses were corrected by bootstraps of 1,000 replications, with clusters at the district level. Significance 
of the estimate is reported following the percentiles of the distributions of the bootstrapped estimator. 
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%. 
                                                       
25 Table A.2 (in the appendix) shows additional balancing of selection variables for one-to-one (unrestricted), radial (with 
radii of 0.05 and 0.1), and a 0.06 bandwidth kernel matching. The radial and kernel estimations seem to do a better job and 
achieve balancing of all the selection variables. However, the results are qualitatively the same. 
26 Alternative calipers (that is, 0.025, 0.01, 0.075, 0.1, 0.12, and 0.15) lead to very similar results. 
27 These results are also robust to alternative radii. Radii of 0.025, 0.01, 0.075, 0.1, 0.12, and 0.15 yield similar results. 
28 This 0.06 bandwidth was cross-validated following the leave-one-out procedure proposed by Frölich (2004) and Black 
and Smith (2004). 16 
All in all, this information constitutes the first evidence that the productivity effect is larger than 
the Field effect. Also, given the much larger increase in income versus hours of work in agricultural self-
employed activities, the returns per hour in this sector are increasing. Comparatively, though, changes in 
returns in the nonagricultural activities remained constant. Though not conclusive, this would be 
indicative of a shift in investments from nonagricultural to agricultural self-employed activities. Indeed, 
these results should be interpreted with caution due to various pitfalls: They use district-level proxies for 
household characteristics, exploit only geographic variation of a policy that was implemented in different 
moments of time, and so on. The following section attempts to address these shortcomings. 
Panel Data 
Estimations using the panel dataset present several advantages with respect to those discussed in the 
previous section. First, they capture not only geographic dispersion of the treatment but also time 
variation. Second, they allow us to control for individual household pretreatment characteristics rather 
than relying on aggregate-level proxies. Better controls are important because, in essence, this paper relies 
on selection in observables to estimate the effect of PETT. Third, if there are omitted variables in the 
selection process, the panel estimation allows us to at least exclude time-invariant unobservables. 
Table 5.4 includes the summary statistics of incomes and hours of work from wage-earning, 
nonagricultural self-employed, and agricultural self-employed activities in the panel data. Consistent with 
Table 5.1, households in the treatment groups experience larger increases in all income categories when 
compared to a control group. However, there are clearly differentiated patterns in labor allocation. 
Changes in hours of work spent on wage-earning activities are roughly the same in both groups, but titled 
households have larger decreases in their hours of work spent on nonagricultural activities and much 
larger increases in the hours of work spent on self-employed activities. As detailed in this section, these 
differences in labor allocation remain even after controlling for observables and time-invariant 
unobservables. 
Table 5.4—Panel: Changes in household income and hours of work in pre- and post-treatment 
periods 
Dependent  Control    Treatment 
Variable  Pre  Post  Diff      Pre  Post  Diff   
Monthly income
1                   
  Wage earning  154.7  309.6  154.8 
***    244.1  416.0  171.9 
*** 
  Nonagricultural self-employment  72.5  100.3  27.7 
*    134.9  185.3  50.4   
  Agricultural self-employment  233.3  311.2  77.8 
***    262.6  421.6  159.0 
* 
  Total  460.6  721.0  260.4 
***    641.5  1022.9  381.4 
*** 
Weekly hours of work                   
  Wage earning  55.8  59.6  3.8      63.5  67.1  3.6   
  Nonagricultural self-employment  8.9  7.6  -1.3      17.0  12.1  -4.8 
** 
  Agricultural self-employment  37.4  38.3  1.0      31.1  43.5  12.4 
*** 
  Total  102.1  105.6  3.5      111.6  122.7  11.1 
* 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey and the 1994, 1997 and 2000 Peruvian LSMS. 
Note: 1Monthly  income is reported in equivalent soles of May 2000 of metropolitan Lima. 
Asterisks denote significance of t-tests, on the difference of means between the treatment and of means between the treatment and 
control groups: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
Summary statistics for (unmatched) pretreatment characteristics of titled and untitled households 
are presented in the first two columns of Table5.5. They show that the pretitling features of the two 
groups were considerably different. For example, the distance to the capital is almost twice as large in the 
control compared to the treatment group. Some differences also arise in the characteristics of dwelling, 
age, and migration status of the head of household. To compare these dissimilar groups, a random-effects 17 
probit was estimated to calculate the probability of receiving a property title (see Table A.3 in the 
appendix). The explanatory variables considered are characteristics of the head of household, 
demographic composition, assets, and some district and geographic characteristics. Fortunately—given 
the large number of control households (around four controls per treated household)—matching methods 
achieve balance of all proposed characteristics in the common support, as suggested by the matched 
characteristics of households in the last two columns of Table 5.5.
29 
Table 5.5—Panel: Pretreatment characteristics of the treatment and control group, before and 
after matching 
Dependent  Unmatched    Matched
1 
Variable  Control  Treatment      Control  Treatment   
Household head               
  Age   45.51  48.31 
*    46.74  46.12   
  Years of education  5.51  5.38      4.74  5.88   
  Female
2  8.10%  11.00%      9.00%  5.10%   
  Married
2  87.90%  83.10%      87.20%  89.70%   
  Speaks native language
2  33.90%  34.70%      39.70%  39.70%   
  Migrant
2  76.90%  83.90% 
*    75.60%  78.20%   
Household composition               
  Household size  5.55  5.62      5.73  5.67   
  Dependency ratio  1.10  1.07      1.03  1.10   
Assets               
  Own land  3.90  3.64      3.10  3.55   
  Value of durable assets
3  439.24  652.45      398.10  621.98   
  Connected to electricity grid
2  19.80%  28.00% 
*    19.20%  28.20%   
  Dirt floor
2  79.50%  86.40% 
*    91.00%  88.50%   
  Cane/mud walls
2  21.60%  13.60% 
*    15.40%  15.40%   
  Mud roofs
2  28.40%  16.90% 
**    25.60%  19.20%   
District characteristics               
  Bioclimate score  53.50  63.56 
***    58.27  60.45   
  Score of soil quality  56.45  60.47 
**    57.76  57.50   
  Average temperature (°C)  16.83  13.43 
***    15.03  14.33   
  Average rainfall (mm/month) 
4  64.16  59.76      68.59  65.38   
  Population density  103.32  92.40      95.64  80.80   
Geographic characteristics               
  Distance to provincial capital (km)  18.12  9.44 
***    11.19  11.59   
  Slope  12.23  13.94      13.62  14.13   
  Altitude (km above sea level)  1.49  2.14 
***    1.98  1.89   
  Jungle
2  29.30%  26.30%      33.30%  34.90%   
  Highlands
2  48.50%  68.60% 
***    57.30%  59.00%   
                 
N     454  118        102  102    
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey and the 1994, 1997 and 2000 Peruvian LSMS. 
Note: 
1 
Means of treatment and control groups after a one-to-one propensity score matching (with a caliper of 0.05), in the 
common support, on all the variables included in this table. 
2 
In the case of discrete variables, a t-test of proportions was applied. 
3 Value of the following durable assets: kitchen, television, radio, phone, refrigerator, motorcycle, blender, boiler, car, and 
sewing machine. The value is expressed in equivalent soles of May 2000 of metropolitan Lima. 
4 Average of the minimum and maximum monthly rainfalls in the district (in mm). 
Asterisks denote significance of t-tests, on the difference of means between the treatment and of means between the 
treatment and control groups: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
Although this probability is based on pretreatment characteristics, the outcomes are differences in 
incomes and hours of work. Each treated household’s change in an outcome was matched with that of a 
                                                       
29 This is also the case for other matching methods: unrestricted one-to-one and radial (with radii of 0.01 and 0.05) 
matchings, as shown in Table A.4 in the appendix. 18 
control household (at least for those in the common support region), such that the difference in 
probabilities of treatment is minimized. Also, the time span in both pairs of observations was forced to be 
the same. If the changes in the outcomes of the titled household come from a certain time span (that is, 
1997–2000, 2000–2004, or 1997–2004), it was compared to the changes in the outcomes of an 
observation in the control group in the same period. In this way, the estimation eliminates time effects due 
to macroeconomic policies or economic cycles, as well as time-invariant unobservables. 
The ATT effects (difference-in-differences estimations) are provided in Table 5.6. Four different 
estimators applying one-to-one (unrestricted and with a 0.05 caliper) and radial (with radii of 0.01 and 
0.05) matching methods are shown.
30 Aside from small differences, the estimates are the same across 
alternative matching methods. Results indicate, on one side, that there is a reallocation of labor from 
nonagricultural to agricultural self-employed activities. Although hours of work on nonagricultural 
activities decreased on average by around 2 hours, the estimate suggests that the decrease among the 
treated groups was more than double this number. For hours of work in agricultural activities, there was 
almost no change in the control group, while the treatment group experienced a considerable increase 
(between 10 and 11, depending on the estimate). 
Though not statistically significant, the point estimates suggest large increases in agricultural 
earnings. On average, the increase among the titled households was around four to six times that 
experienced by those in the control group. In contrast, the income gains of titled households in the 
nonagricultural sector were roughly half those of their counterparts. Once again, changes in income 
relative to changes in hours in the treatment group suggest an increase in productivity in agricultural self-
employment. 
Thus, the panel results seem to confirm the results from the cross-section. There are some 
differences in the magnitudes, arguably arising from controlling for household time-invariant 
nonobservable attributes in the difference-in-differences estimation. Despite these small differences, 
however, the storyboard remains the same: The proposed Field effect is smaller than the productivity 
effect. 
Table 5.6—Panel: Average treatment on the treated effect - Ddifference-in-Differences (DID) 
estimation, by matching method
 
     One-to-One (No Caliper)    Caliper = 0.05 
     Control    Treatment    DID      Control    Treatment    DID   
Monthly income 
1                           
  Wage earning  197.3    185.5    -11.9      205.1    186.6    -18.5   
  (140.8) 
*  (67.3) 
***  (159.5)      (125.2) 
*  (74.6) 
***  (149.2)   
  Nonagricultural 
self-employment 
68.5    28.8    -39.7      68.8    28.8    -40.0   
  (60.0)    (51.1)    (76.5)      (69.4)    (56.6)    (92.2)   
  Agricultural self-
employment 
39.7    231.8    192.1      49.3    231.2    181.9   
  (84.7)    (114.2) 
**  (140.7)      (97.7)    (114.0) 
***  (146.0)   
  Total  305.6    446.1    140.5      323.2    446.6    123.4   
  (187.3) 
*  (145.6) 
***  (235.0)      (184.9) 
*  (144.6) 
***  (232.7)   
                             
Weekly hours of work                         
  Wage earning  16.2    3.1    -13.1      15.8    2.4    -13.5   
  (14.9)    (7.5)    (16.3)      (14.8)    (8.4)    (16.9)   
  Nonagricultural 
self-employment 
1.4    -4.1    -5.5      1.2    -4.1    -5.4   
  (3.9)    (2.8)    (4.9)      (4.1)    (3.2)    (5.4)   
  Agricultural self-
employment 
0.1    11.9    11.9      0.2    11.3    11.1   
  (5.8)    (3.6) 
***  (6.7) 
*    (5.5)    (3.7) 
***  (6.4) 
* 
  Total  17.6    10.9    -6.8      17.3    9.5    -7.8   
  (16.5)    (7.1)    (17.3)      (16.1)    (8.2)    (18.0)   
 
   
                                                       
30 These results are fairly robust to the choice of different calipers and radii (not shown here) 19 
Table 5.6—Continued 
      Radius = 0.05     Radius = 0.01 
      Control     Treatment     DID        Control     Treatment     DID    
                             
Monthly income 
1                           
  Wage earning   178.38    183.52    5.14      179.46    193.94    14.48   
  (94.20) 
***  (75.20) 
**  (125.10)      (90.40) 
***  (80.70) 
***  (122.00)   
  Nonagricultural 
self-employment 
56.66    32.00    -24.66      51.57    34.96 
  -16.61   
  (34.30) 
**  (56.70)    (67.50)      (36.20) 
*  (60.00) 
  (69.20)   
  Agricultural self-
employment 
59.30    234.63    175.33      63.04    244.27 
  181.22   
  (41.30)    (129.50) 
**  (136.60)      (43.50)    (139.40) 
**  (145.80)   
  Total  294.35    450.15    155.81      294.08    473.17 
  179.09   
  (116.70) 
***  (158.40) 
***  (201.20)      (120.90) 
***  (172.70) 
***  (212.70)   
                       
     
Weekly hours of work                   
     
  Wage earning  10.69    2.71    -7.98 
    9.47    2.70 
  -6.77 
 
  -(9.80)    -(8.90)    -(13.60) 
    -(9.70)    -(9.50) 
  -(13.30) 
 
  Nonagricultural 
self-employment 
0.59    -4.04    -4.64 
    -0.02    -3.35 
  -3.33 
 
  (2.20)    (3.30)    (4.00) 
    (2.30)    (3.70) 
  (4.50) 
 
  Agricultural self-
employment 
0.16    11.22    11.06 
    -0.12    9.64 
  9.76 
 
  (3.50)    (3.90) 
***  (5.30) 
**    (3.40)    (4.40) 
*
*  (5.40) 
* 
  Total  11.45    9.88    -1.56 
    9.33    8.98 
  -0.34 
 
  (10.80)    (8.30)    (14.00) 
    (10.70)    (9.40) 
  (14.00) 
 
        
     
     
        
     
     
  
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey and the 1994, 1997 and 2000 Peruvian LSMS. 
Note: 
 Matching based on propensity score, in the common support, estimated through a probit equation of the treatment dummy 
on the covariates included in Table 5.5. Probit estimation is presented in Table A.3 in the appendix. 
1 Monthly income is reported in equivalent soles of May 2000 of metropolitan Lima.  
Standard errors in parentheses were calculating with a bootstrap of 1,000 replications, with clusters at the district level. 
Significance of the estimate is reported following the percentiles of the distributions of the bootstrapped estimator.  
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
Check for Attrition in Sample 
One concern is that attrition might be partly responsible for the results presented previously. The logic is 
as follows: If property titles enable households to sell their land and leave their communities, then the 
most likely to do so are those households with less potential for agricultural activities. These observations 
would then drop out of the sample, and only those with higher prospective agricultural income will 
remain in it. 
To address this problem, the full-sample estimates of the previous subsection were compared with 
the ones from a restricted panel of the 2000–2004 rounds. When collecting information from the previous 
LSMS in 2004, the design of the survey targeted most of the rural households in the 2000 LSMS. As a 
result, the attrition rate for this subsample was considerably lower (around 10 percent in a four-year 
period). Table 5.7 shows the characteristics (in 2000) of households that owned land in 2000 and were 
reinterviewed in 2004 (Panel A) and of those that owned land in 2000 but dropped out of the 2004 sample 
(Panel B). Households in Panel B were more likely to speak a native language and had a smaller 
proportion of female heads. However, they are similar in all other household characteristics. Of more 
importance is that they are similar in terms of their land and their hours of work and income across 
alternative activities. This piece of information suggests that—at least in the most relevant dimensions—
households that “moved out” or could not be reinterviewed were not significantly different from the ones 
that stayed. 20 
Table 5.7—Characteristics (in 2000) of attrited and nonattrited households (between the 2000 and 
2004 rounds) 
    Both in 2004 and 2000  Only in 2000 
Female household head  12.1%  4.5% 
Age of household head  48.2  46.2 
Household head is married  83.1%  81.2% 
HH head speaks native language  44.9%  51.9% 
Years of education of household head  5.8  6.1 
Household head is migrant  78.3%  75.1% 
HH size  5.1  5.0 
  % of members 0–6 y.o.  16.8%  15.4% 
  % of members 7–14 y.o.  19.4%  16.9% 
  % of members 15–35 y.o.  30.8%  33.3% 
  % of members 36–60 y.o.  21.0%  20.0% 
  % of members >60 y.o.  12.0%  14.4% 
Connection to sewerage  24.4%  17.4% 
Connection to electricity grid  42.4%  41.6% 
Own land (ha)  2.4  3.1 
HH weekly hours of work  109.7  108.9 
  Nonagricultural self-employed  13.4  12.4 
  Agricultural self-employed  35.0  35.6 
  Wage earning  61.4  60.9 
HH monthly income  557.1  536.3 
  Nonagricultural self-employed  113.3  103.5 
  Agricultural self-employed  223.7  202.0 
  Wage earning  220.2  230.9 
N  881  98 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey and the 2000 Peruvian LSMS. 
Notes:
 Includes only the attrited and nonattrited households in the sample that had land in 2000. 
Asterisks denote significance of t-tests, on the difference of means between groups: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
Table 5.8 presents the propensity score results for the 2000–2004 subsample. Standard errors of 
the ATT increase considerably—probably due to a quite smaller sample size—but, all in all, the estimates 
have the same direction as the ones from the full sample. These results suggest that attrition is not likely 
to be responsible for the results. 
   21 
Table 5.8—Average treatment on the treated effect (difference-in-differences) estimation (one-to-
one matching) 
      Sample 
   2000–2004    All
1   
Income (monthly)         
  Wage earning  105.8    -11.9   
    (309.8)    (159.5)   
  Nonagricultural self-employment  -23.5    -39.7   
    (219.2)    (76.5)   
  Agricultural self-employment  161.1    192.1   
    (192.2)    (140.7)   
  Total  243.4    140.5   
    (257.0)    (235.0)   
Hours of work (weekly)         
  Wage earning  -13.3    -13.1   
    (27.1)    (16.3)   
  Nonagricultural self-employment  -19.2    -5.5   
    (25.0)    (4.9)   
  Agricultural self-employment  8.1    11.9   
    (11.3)    (6.7)  * 
  Total  -24.3    -6.8   
    (19.4)    (17.3)   
N treated  45    118   
N control  118     454    
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey and the 2000 Peruvian LSMS. 
Notes :Estimation followed the same procedures as the estimations in Table 5.6 with a restricted sample for (nonattrited) 
households in the 2000–2004 panel. 
1This column corresponds to the results presented in Table 5.6. 
Standard errors in parentheses were calculated with a bootstrap of 1,000 replications, with clusters at the district level. 
Significance of the estimate is reported following the percentiles of the distributions of the bootstrapped estimator.  
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
A possible explanation for this is that even when a proportion of households moved out, it was 
not because of the high prospects of selling their land. The Peruvian land market is relatively thin and 
might have hindered this kind of behavior.
31 This is also consistent with the findings of Larson et al. 
(2000) and Barrantes and Trivelli (1994), who argue that property titles in Peru do not increase the 
fluidity in the land market. Treated households might not have been able to sell their land even after a title 
was issued. 
The Role of Tenure Security 
One of the main points of the model presented in Section 2 is that titles increase households’ tenure 
security. If the households increase their perception of security (φ ), they shift their capital toward 
agricultural activities; thus, productivity in this sector increases and more labor is reallocated to it. In 
terms of the model, imagine that there are two types of households in the population, characterized by 
) , (
1 θ φ f H  and  ) , (
2 θ φ f H , where  2 1
θ θ φ φ >  . If this is the case and   and   are complementary factors 

















                                                       
31 Zegarra (1999) discusses the relative underdevelopment of Peruvian land markets and some of the causes of it. 22 
Unfortunately, there are no questions regarding tenure security perceptions in the 1994, 1997, and 
2000 LSMS rounds, but this question was included in the 2004 PETT survey. Titled and untitled 
households were asked to estimate the likelihood of having their land expropriated. They had to choose 
the most accurate among five options: (a) very sure expropriation will NOT take place, (b) relatively sure 
expropriation will NOT take place, (c) expropriation is quite a likely outcome, (d) expropriation is very 
likely, or (e) does not know. Those that responded (a), (b), and (c) were labeled as “sure” about their 
property rights, while those who answered (c) and (d) were deemed “unsure.” A small proportion did not 
know (e) and were excluded from the sample. 
When the sample was split, there were not many households that were titled and remained unsure 
about their property rights. In this respect, the titling process seemed to have been effective in increasing 
the perception of security. Despite the small number of observations in this group,  a propensity score 
estimate was constructed and differentiated effects were calculated for “sure” and “unsure” titled 
households. This would be equivalent to a heterogeneous treatment effect. In a regression framework, this 
is similar to an estimate of  3 β  in  Sure x Titled Sure Titled Y 3 2 1 β β β + + = . 
The results are presented in Table 5.9. There is a large increase in the standard errors, so the 
results are not statistically significant. However, they indicate that, if anything, there is a much larger 
increase in hours of work and income in agricultural self-employment among the “sure.” In contrast, this 
group experiences the contrary effect for nonagricultural activities. This result suggests that, at least in 
part, tenure security is driving the effect of property titles on labor allocation. 
Table 5.9—Cross-section: Average treatment on the treated effect
 by tenure security perception
 
      Sure    Not Sure    
(A)-(B)        Treatment  Control  Diff (A)    Treatment  Control  Diff (B)    
Monthly income                   
  Wage   440.6  402.4  38.2    573.0  338.9  234.1    -195.9 
  earning  (40.0)  (73.5)  (83.5)    (234.3)  (164.8)  (272.7)    (272.9) 
 
Nonagricultural 
self-  170.0  171.9  -1.9    424.3  208.4  216.0    -217.9 
  employment  (36.0)  (59.9)  (61.6)    (213.2)  (130.7)  (247.6)    (243.1) 
  Agricultural self-  463.2  304.2  158.9    273.1  249.8  23.3    135.6 
  employment  (63.4)  (80.6)  (91.9)    (86.9)  (143.6)  (169.9)    (171.2) 
  Total  1073.7  878.5  195.1    1270.4  797.0  473.4    -278.2 
    (73.1)  (108.4)  (121.4)    (356.6)  (238.3)  (407.9)    (395.4) 
Weekly hours of work                 
  Wage   61.5  57.1  4.4    61.3  54.8  6.5    -2.1 
  earning  (4.1)  (6.5)  (7.2)    (13.6)  (15.4)  (19.8)    (20.1) 
 
Nonagricultural 
self-  12.3  14.1  -1.8    22.9  15.2  7.8    -9.5 
  employment  (2.3)  (4.0)  (3.9)    (10.1)  (8.3)  (12.0)    (11.6) 
  Agricultural self-  41.1  37.5  3.6    38.2  38.0  0.2    3.4 
  employment  (1.9)  (3.3)  (3.6)    (3.7)  (6.0)  (7.0)    (7.6) 
  Total  114.9  108.7  6.2    122.5  108.0  14.5    -8.2 
    (4.2)  (8.1)  (8.1)    (18.3)  (18.4)  (23.7)    (23.6) 
N     401  336       48  230         
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey. 
Notes:
 Estimation method: one-to-one matching with 0.05 caliper. 
Households were asked if they considered expropriation as a likely outcome. There were five options: (a) very sure expropriation 
will NOT take place, (b) relatively sure expropriation will NOT take place, (c) expropriation is quite a likely outcome, (d) 
expropriation is very likely, or (e) does not know. (a) and (b) were considered to be “sure,” while (c) and (d) were considered 
“unsure” about their tenure security. Those who responded (e) were excluded from the sample. 
Standard errors in parentheses were calculated with a bootstrap of 1,000 replications, with clusters at the district level. 
Significance of the estimate is reported following the percentiles of the distributions of the bootstrapped estimator.  
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
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Substitution of Family and Hired Labor 
The estimates presented so far are based on household labor allocation. Another possibility is that these 
estimates merely reflect the substitution of family labor for hired labor: The increase in household labor in 
agricultural activities might come at the expense of a reduction of hired labor, and the net effect of these 
changes can be ambiguous. Analogously, the reductions in nonagricultural household labor can be a mere 
substitution for an increase in hired workers. In terms of equation (2) in Section 2, family and nonfamily 
labor are indistinguishable (both grouped in 𝐻𝑓 and 𝐻𝑛). 
To analyze this possibility, data for hired labor was used in the panel framework. Unfortunately, 
the surveys did not collect data for hours of hired agricultural labor and have no information (neither 
hours nor wages) about nonagricultural hired labor. However, there is information about household 
expenses for agricultural wages. Propensity score matching estimations with this data are presented in 
Table 5.10. The results indicate that, if anything, titled households have larger agricultural payroll 
expenses than their counterparts. This might indicate that titled households are not only allocating more 
family labor to agricultural self-employed activities, but are even hiring more external labor for these 
activities. In this line, the results are probably not driven by substitutions between family and nonfamily 
labor.
32 Thus, the general conclusions of the paper still seem to hold. 
Table 5.10—Panel: Changes in household (monthly) expenditures in agricultural wages in pre- and 
post-treatment periods, by matching method 
   Control     Treatment     DID 
   Pre  Post  Diff (a)    Pre  Post  Diff (b)     (a)-(b) 
                   
One-to-one  28.1  30.5  2.3    20.2  28.3  8.0    5.7 
  (9.6)  (10.4)  (10.8)    (5.1)  (6.4)  (6.0)    (12.1) 
Caliper=0.05  29.3  31.6  2.3    21.2  29.1  7.8    5.6 
  (10.9)  (10.8)  (12.0)    (6.5)  (8.0)  (7.3)    (13.6) 
Caliper=0.01  30.0  34.0  4.1    23.2  30.3  7.1    3.0 
  (11.1)  (12.6)  (14.8)    (7.9)  (9.6)  (8.0)    (16.8) 
Radius=0.05  27.8  29.3  1.5    21.2  29.5  8.2    6.7 
  (6.6)  (6.7)  (5.7)    (6.6)  (8.0)  (6.7)    (8.4) 
Radius=0.01  28.9  30.8  1.9    22.9  30.1  7.2    5.3 
  (5.8)  (5.9)  (6.3)    (7.4)  (9.4)  (8.1)    (10.1) 
Kernel  28.9  30.5  1.7    22.7  29.5  6.8    5.1 
  (5.6)  (6.0)  (5.8)    (7.5)  (9.7)  (8.0)    (9.5) 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey and the 1994, 1997 and 2000 Peruvian LSMS. 
Notes:
  Expenses in agricultural wages are expressed in equivalent soles of May 2000 of metropolitan Lima. 
Standard errors in parentheses were calculated with a bootstrap of 1,000 replications, with clusters at the district level. 
Significance of the estimate is reported following the percentiles of the distributions of the bootstrapped estimator. 
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
Robustness Check 
A robustness check for the hypothesis of shifts between investment in nonagricultural and agricultural 
self-employed activities is presented. This robustness check is based on the following reasoning. If the 
reason for changes in productivity between these two sectors is investment, larger changes are expected in 
the capital stock in each to experience more pronounced variations with longer time exposure to the 
property title. If this is true, then the differential in productivity between agricultural and nonagricultural 
self-employment should be higher for households that received the PETT intervention earlier. It should be 
                                                       
32 Indeed, one can argue that this reasoning is inaccurate because there can be differences in hourly wages between treated 
and untreated areas. If wages in treated areas are sufficiently high, titled households might actually be hiring fewer hired hours of 
work. Although I cannot rule out this possibility, it has been shown that propensity score matching techniques balance local 
observable characteristics of treated and untreated areas. 24 
noted that no definite conclusions should be extracted from this check and that more detailed data on 
investment patterns in different activities is required for a thorough assessment of the proposed 
productivity channel. 
First, the panel dataset and separate households based on time of exposure to the treatment was 
used to test for this possibility. They were separated t into two groups: (1) households whose post-
treatment outcomes were measured four or fewer years after receiving the title and (2) those whose post-
treatment outcomes were measured more than four years after receiving the title. For example, consider a 
household in the treatment group observed in the 1997–2004 span. If it received the title after 2000, then 
it would be in the first group. Otherwise, it would be in the second. Next, within these subsamples, 
propensity score matching was performed based on the same variables proposed above to check for 
differences in the ATT (difference-in-differences) effect. A caveat of this robustness check is that these 
results should not be interpreted as an independent estimation of the effect of the treatment in groups that 
have held the title for more or fewer years. When disaggregating by time of exposure, the small number 
of observations per individual period prevents me from estimating separate probit equations for each one. 
The estimates are based on the same probit equation, and the only difference is the group in which titled 
and untitled households are matched by their propensity score. Thus, these results should be interpreted 
more as decompositions of the ATT effect for the whole sample in different periods rather than as 
individual estimates.
33 For the sake of brevity, only the decomposition of the one-to-one unrestricted 
matching is presented, though the results are consistent regardless of the specific matching technique 
used. 
The results of this check are presented in Table 5.11 and are comparable to those in the first three 
columns of Table 5.6. Two patterns emerge from this decomposition. First, it suggests that the process of 
labor reallocation is gradual over time. Increases in hours of agricultural work and reductions in hours of 
nonagricultural self-employed activities are larger in households that have been exposed to the treatment 
for longer periods of time. These results are consistent with how the productivity effect operates due to 
higher capital accumulation with respect to longer exposure to property rights. Second, it can be noted 
that the relative difference between changes in income and changes in hours of work in both agricultural 
and nonagricultural self-employed activities rises within households that have held property titles for 
longer. This would suggest that investment recomposition has some influence in the results. 
   
                                                       
33 Nevertheless, the two approaches are the same, assuming that the weights given to different variables by the probit 
equation are constant in time, that is, if the selection criteria of the program remained unaltered in the different subperiods. 25 
Table 5.11—Decomposition of the average treatment on the treated effect by number of years of 
titling
1 
     More Than Four Years of Titling    Four or Fewer Years of Titling 
     Control    Treatment    DID      Control    Treatment    DID   
Monthly income                           
  Wage earning  182.4 
  218.3 
  35.9      96.9    150.9 
  54.0 
 
  (130.8) 
  (96.5) 
***  (164.7)      (94.5)    (76.1) 
**  (125.5) 
 
  Nonagricultural self-
employment 
92.6 
  -33.7 
  -126.2      84.3    72.8 
  -11.5 
 
  (81.0) 
  (74.9) 
  (107.7)      (64.4)    (52.2) 
  (84.0) 
 
  Agricultural self-
employment 
91.2 
  409.6 
  318.4      46.4    87.0 
  40.6 
 
  (105.8) 
  (241.1) 
***  (268.2)      (90.1)    (73.9) 
  (105.4) 
 
  Total  366.1 
  594.2 
  228.1      227.6    310.7 
  83.1 
 
  (187.4) 
**  (266.7) 
***  (337.2)      (155.9)    (123.9) 
***  (200.5) 
 
Weekly hours of work 
   
             
   
 
  Wage earning  26.0 
  -2.2 
  -28.2      7.3    4.4 
  -2.9 
 
  (17.5) 
  (10.6) 
  (22.1)      (12.2)    (9.7) 
  (15.8) 
 
  Nonagricultural self-
employment 
3.5 
  -3.4 
  -6.8      0.5    -4.8 
  -5.3 
 
  (4.5) 
  (3.5) 
  (5.9)      (4.0)    (3.9) 
  (5.7) 
 
  Agricultural self-
employment 
-4.0 
  8.7 
  12.7      1.2    13.0 
  11.8 
 
  (6.4) 
  (5.0) 
*  (8.4)      (4.7)    (4.4) 
***  (6.3) 
** 
  Total  25.7 
  2.9 
  -22.8      9.0    12.7 
  3.7 
 
  (18.4) 
  (10.0) 
  (23.6)      (13.3)    (9.7) 
  (16.4) 
 
N     454 
   49 
            454     69 
     
  
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey and the 1994, 1997 and 2000 Peruvian LSMS. 
Notes:
1 Average treatment on the treated (ATT) effects are calculated following the same methodology as in Table 5.6. Probit regression 
was estimated using the full sample (1994–2004), but individuals are matched only within each sample. 
Standard errors in parentheses were calculated with a bootstrap of 1,000 replications, with clusters at the district level. Significance of the 
estimate is reported following the percentiles of the distributions of the bootstrapped estimator.  
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
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6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, evidence has been presented about the relatively unexplored relationship between labor 
allocation patterns and land property rights.  The paper develops a model in which there are two effects 
by which land titling affects labor allocation. On one hand, titling releases time that was used for land-
guarding purposes and should thus have a negative effect on on-farm hours of work (Field effect). On the 
other hand, property rights should increase tenure security, promote land-attached investments, increase 
productivity in agricultural activities, and increase the number of on-farm hours of work (productivity 
effect). 
To empirically assess the net impact of these two opposite effects, the Special Program of Land 
Titling (PETT), a massive program in rural, Peru was analyzed.  Two separate datasets, a cross-section 
based on a 2004 survey and a four-round (1994/1997/2000/2004) panel dataset, were constructed. Using 
proxies for pretreatment characteristics from censuses previous to the implementation of PETT, 
propensity score matching methods were used on the 2004 cross-section. The results showed that the 
productivity effect dominates the Field effect, such that land titling leads to a larger number of on-farm 
hours of work. Additionally, estimates of the effect of the titles in a smaller panel of households confirm 
the cross-sectional results. The findings are consistent with the theoretical model when land titles 
considerably decrease the possibility of expropriation and there is complementarity between agricultural 
capital and labor. 
There is previous evidence of the positive relationship between property rights and investments in 
agricultural capital. In that spirit, this study suggests that these results are driven by increases in 
agricultural labor productivity. Nonetheless, the evidence of this investment-shift hypothesis presented 
here is far from conclusive. The objective of this paper has been to present a preliminary exploration of 
this effect. More work is required in this area to fully understand investment reallocation processes and 
should constitute a priority in a future research agenda. 
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APPENDIX: PROBIT MODELS FOR PROBABILITIES OF TREATMENT 
Table A.1—Probit for propensity score: Cross-section (2004) 
    Coefficient  S.E. 
Population Census 1993 (district level)     
  % of households with pipeline water  2.8791  (0.6104)*** 
  % of households with electricity  -0.4445  (0.4937) 
  % of households with dirt floors  -1.9335  (0.3584)*** 
  % of households with sewerage  4.4837  (0.8702)*** 
  % of population speaking native language  -0.0805  (0.2219) 
  % of population with secondary education  -4.2751  (1.3289)*** 
  % of population with tertiary education  4.2069  (2.5265)* 
  Average dependency ratio  -5.8237  (2.5447)** 
  % of population working in agriculture  1.0125  (0.3171)*** 
  Population density in district  0.0009  (0.0003)*** 
Agricultural Census 1994 (district level)     
  Average size of landholding  0.0498  (0.0253)** 
  % of land with irrigation in district  0.0062  (0.2344) 
  Total agricultural land in district (’000s ha)  0.0164  (0.0069)*** 
  Bioclimate score  -0.0021  (0.0035) 
  Score of soil quality  0.0289  (0.0053)*** 
Geographic variables (household level)     
  Distance to provincial capital (km)  -0.0350  (0.0050)*** 
  Slope  -0.0088  (0.0046)* 
  Altitude (km above sea level)  0.0003  (0.0010) 
  Average temperature (°C)   -0.1004  (0.0207)*** 
Weather variables (district level)     
  Average rainfall in district 
2   -0.0088  (0.0020)*** 
  Jungle  1.7793  (0.2692)*** 
  Highlands  1.4868  (0.2976)*** 
Constant  3.7232  (1.5277)** 
Observations  1,043 
LR test  326.9 
Prob > χ  0.0000 
Pseudo R  0.2285 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey, the 1994 Peruvian National Agricultural Census and the 1993 
Peruvian Population Census. 
Notes:  Dependent variable: 1= Titled by PETT, 0=Not titled. 
1 Average of the minimum and maximum monthly rainfalls in the district (in mm). 
Standard Error (SE) clustered at the district level.  
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
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Table A.2—Pretreatment proxies of the treatment and control groups, before and after matching 
      No Caliper    Radius (r=0.05)    Radius (r=0.01)    Kernel 
      Control  Treatment      Control  Treatment      Control  Treatment      Control  Treatment   
Population Census 1993 (district)                               
   % households (HHs) with pipeline   
   water 
21.3%  22.3% 
   
21.1%  22.6% 
   
22.1%  21.1% 
   
23.4%  22.3% 
 
   % HHs with electricity  24.0%  26.0%      24.8%  26.0%      25.9%  24.8%      28.0%  26.0%   
   % HHs with dirt floors  72.9%  73.8%      74.4%  75.2%      73.9%  74.4%      74.0%  73.8%   
   % HHs with sewerage  14.5%  14.5%      13.5%  13.8%      14.4%  13.5%      15.4%  14.5%   
   % population speaking native    
   language 
35.3%  28.9% 
*   
33.6%  34.1% 
   
29.1%  31.6% 
   
31.1%  28.9% 
 
   % population with secondary  
   education 
19.8%  20.0% 
   
19.8%  20.1% 
   
20.0%  19.8% 
   
20.4%  20.0% 
 
   % population with tertiary  
   education 
6.1%  6.6% 
   
6.2%  6.1% 
   
6.6%  6.2% 
   
7.0%  6.6% 
 
Average dependency ratio  49.8%  49.4%      49.8%  50.0%      49.4%  49.8%      49.5%  49.4%   
   % population working in   
   agriculture 
28.5%  26.9% 
   
29.3%  27.4% 
   
28.0%  29.5% 
   
26.8%  26.9% 
 
   Population density in district  120.9  112.1      117.8  119.6      110.3  114.8      119.7  112.1   
Agricultural Census 1994 (district)                               
   Average size of landholding (ha)  3.539  3.603      3.765  3.480      3.575  3.765      3.571  3.603   
   % irrigated land in district  35.90%  37.71%      36.95%  35.40%      37.78%  36.95%      35.58%  37.71%   
   Total agricultural land in district (ha)  7700.5  7624.2      7642.9  7046.6      7629.9  7642.9      7340.8  7624.2   
   Bioclimate score  63.2  62.2      62.6  66.9      62.2  62.6      62.5  62.2   
   Score of soil quality  60.7  60.5      60.1  59.6      60.4  60.1      60.1  60.5   
Geographic variables (household)                               
   Distance to provincial capital (km)  10.4  10.6      11.0  10.4      10.7  11.0      11.2  10.6   
   Slope  12.4  12.8      13.2  13.8      12.8  13.2      12.9  12.8   
   Altitude (km above sea level)  2.1  2.1      2.1  2.2      2.1  2.1      2171.1  2.1   
   Jungle
1  29.9%  29.0%      29.3%  27.6%      29.0%  29.3%      30.0%  29.0%   
   Highlands
1  65.5%  66.8%      67.2%  70.5%      66.8%  67.2%      66.3%  66.8%   
Weather variables (district )                               
   Average rainfall 
2  53.30  61.37      61.93  58.82      61.25  61.93      62.63  61.37   
   Average temperature (°C)  14.08  13.68      13.54  13.13      13.67  13.54      13.44  13.68   
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey, the 1994 Peruvian National Agricultural Census and the 1993 Peruvian Population Census. 
Notes: 
 Balancing comparable to Table 5.2, using alternative matching methods. Standard errors clustered at the district level.  
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
1 A test of differences of proportions was applied for discrete variables. 
2 Average of the minimum and maximum monthly rainfalls in the district (in mm). 29 
Table A.3—Random-effects probit for propensity score: Panel
 
      Coefficient  S.E.
1 
Household head     
  Female  1.1193  (1.8200) 
  Age   0.0695  (0.0348)** 
  Married  -1.2873  (1.6881) 
  Speaks native language  -0.9402  (0.9485) 
  Years of education  0.0749  (0.1177) 
  Migrant  -1.6771  (1.0696) 
Household composition     
  Household size  0.1475  (0.1514) 
  Dependency ratio  -0.1885  (0.4486) 
Assets     
  Own land  0.1109  (0.0845) 
  Dwelling connected to electricity grid  -0.5523  (0.9458) 
  Value of durable assets
2  0.0005  (0.0002)** 
  Dwelling has dirt floor  -0.4144  (0.9335) 
  Dwelling has cane/mud roofs  0.3653  (0.9171) 
  Dwelling has mud walls  0.5313  (0.9107) 
District characteristics     
  Average temperature (°C)  -0.3705  (0.1435)*** 
  Average rainfall 
3  -0.0637  (0.0193)*** 
  Bioclimate score  -0.0121  (0.0260) 
  Score of soil quality  0.1382  (0.0405)*** 
  Population in 1993 (thousands)  0.0142  (0.0201) 
  Population density  0.0005  (0.0010) 
Geographic characteristics     
  Distance to provincial capital (km)  -0.1734  (0.0478)*** 
  Slope  -0.0491  (0.0330) 
  Altitude (km above sea level)  -0.0017  (0.0008)** 
  Jungle  13.7559  (2.2659)*** 
  Highlands  13.224  (2.3468)*** 
Constant  -13.2631  (4.2237)*** 
Observations  572 
Wald χ
 1(25)  74.97 
Prob>χ
1   0.0000 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey and the 1994, 1997 and 2000 Peruvian LSMS. 
Notes:  Dependent variable: 1=Titled by PETT, 0=Not titled. 
1 Standard errors clustered at the district level. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
2 Value of the following durable assets: kitchen, television, radio, phone, refrigerator, motorcycle, blender, 
boiler, car, and sewing machine. The value is expressed in equivalent soles of May 2000 of Metropolitan Lima. 
3 Average of the minimum and maximum monthly rainfalls in the district (in mm). 
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Table A.4—Pretreatment characteristics of treatment and control group, before and after 
matching: Panel
 
      One-to-One    Radial (r=0.01)    Radial (r=0.05) 
      Control  Treatment      Control  Treatment      Control  Treatment   
Household head                       
  Age   47.7  49.0      48.8  47.3      46.3  46.1   
  Years of education  5.4  4.8      5.2  5.4      5.2  5.9   
  Female  12.0%  8.0%      8.9%  11.3%      11.3%  5.1%   
  Married  82.0%  75.0%      74.6%  82.5%      85.9%  89.7%   
  Speaks native language  36.0%  38.0%      43.0%  35.1%      33.2%  39.7%   
  Migrant  83.0%  79.0%      79.0%  82.5%      76.3%  78.2%   
Household composition                       
  Household size  5.6  5.6      5.6  5.6      6.0  5.7   
  Dependency ratio  1.0  0.9      1.0  1.1      1.1  1.1   
Assets                       
  Own land  3.9  3.8      4.2  4.0      4.5  3.6   
  Value of durable assets
2  727.1  337.3      419.4  726.8      427.1  622.0   
  Connected to electricity grid  21.0%  18.0%      21.9%  26.8%      21.9%  28.2%   
  Dirt floor  86.0%  93.0%      84.3%  87.6%      81.4%  88.5%   
  Cane/mud walls  23.0%  26.0%      30.2%  13.4%      18.4%  15.4%   
  Mud roofs  16.0%  22.0%      25.6%  16.5%      29.0%  19.2%   
District characteristics                       
  Bioclimate score  61.0  62.3      58.4  61.3      54.7  60.5   
  Score of soil quality  60.2  62.9      62.4  59.3      57.4  57.5   
  Average temperature (°C)  13.7  13.3      17.2  13.8      16.0  14.3   
  Average rainfall 
2  70.5  74.8      73.9  61.2      66.1  65.4   
  Population density  119.4  106.3      112.4  91.3      92.2  80.8   
Geographic characteristics                       
 
Distance to provincial capital 
(km)  10.5  9.8      9.8  11.5      11.2  11.6   
  Slope  13.3  13.1      13.4  12.2      13.6  14.1   
  Altitude (km above sea level)  17.3  20.9      20.7  16.5      19.8  18.9   
  Jungle  38.0%  32.0%      39.9%  43.5%      33.3%  34.9%   
  Highlands  50.0%  53.0%      54.9%  52.4%      60.3%  59.0%   
Source: Author’s calculations using the 2004 PETT survey and the 1994, 1997 and 2000 Peruvian LSMS. 
Notes
 Balancing comparable to Table 5.5, using alternative matching methods. Standard errors clustered at the district level. 
1Value of the following durable assets: kitchen, television, radio, phone, refrigerator, motorcycle, blender, boiler, car, and sewing 
machine. The value is expressed in equivalent soles of May 2000 of metropolitan Lima. 
2Average of the minimum and maximum monthly rainfalls in the district (in mm). 
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.   31 
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